Taiwan Should Never Become a Breach in U.S.-China Rivalry
China Times Editorial, September 15, 2022
The hypersensitive “Taiwan Policy Act” was approved by majority in the Foreign Relations Committee of United States Senate, while partial clauses with the dint of Taiwan Sovereignty were revised, but military support of Taiwan was obviously reinforced. Both the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen and the opposition parties expressed their welcoming of this Act. Mainland China warned strongly that this Act is even more detrimental than Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. In private, Qin Gang, mainland China’s ambassador to the United States, warned of “the possible collapse of U.S.-China relations”. We believe that before the end of this U.S. Congressional session early next year, this “Taiwan Policy Act” will continue to pluck the sensitive nerve points of all parties.
Before the formal review of this Act, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan openly expressed his concerns and worries. In the approved revised version of this Act, some wordings contradicting to the U.S. “One China” policy had been removed or fine-tuned, such as Taiwan deemed as “major non-NATO ally” was revised as “entitled to equal treatment as major non-NATO allies”; and removed “the appointment of the director of American Institute in Taiwan is conducted accordingly as that of an ambassador” as well as the name of “Taiwan Representative Office in the United States” was amended as no binding force of a Congressional opinion, etc. Evidently, the is an outcome of consultations and compromises between the administration of President Joe Biden and the Congress.
In other words, the Biden administration is reluctant to be “buckled the hat” of unilateral changing the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, neither to violate the early promise of “no support of Taiwan independence”. This is because that the top-level leadership in both China and the United States still desire to maintain the fundamental pattern of “rivalling without breaking” while striving for more spaces of communication and cooperation.
To cite the recently signed “Auditing Review Agreement” for example, China allowed the United States auditing authority to review in Hong Kong the manuscripts of companies to avoid the delisting risk of hundreds of China concept stocks. This can be interpreted as limited concessions. In like manner, evidences reveal that there are more and more possibilities of the summit meeting between Biden and Xi Jinping in the upcoming Group of 20 summit to be held in Bali Island in November. This also prefigures that it is not possible for the U.S. to see the Taiwan Straits risk being out of control in short term.
“Rivalry without breaking” is one of the main axes of U.S.-China relations for over forty years. This has been reflected in many critically sensitive points in the past, such as U.S. sanctions against China over Tiananmen Massacre Incident, Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis in 1996, the U.S. Air Force bombed mistakenly mainland China’s embassy in Yugoslavia, military aircraft collision over South China Sea and Trump’s launching trade wars against China; and also reflected in the subtle interaction between China and the United States as Beijing did not disturb through military means in Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and neither the U.S. military interfered in Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s circling Taiwan military exercise. Taiwan always is the focal point of U.S.-China “rivalry”, but it never “breaks” because there is a bottom line of “One China” policy whereas the United States will not support Taiwan independence while China will not change its peaceful reunification of Taiwan. However, this pattern of U.S.-China “rivalry without breaking” is shifting to a critical point.
First, the United States itself undertakes a revolutionary change in its cognitive awareness of strategy against China. From the macro global strategical competition perspective, the U.S.-China “rivalry without breaking” in the past was based upon the common interest of a broad bilateral trade and economic linkage. Once the United States regards the failure of contact policy and instead defines bilateral relations in competition, then there no longer is a possibility of “win-win” U.S.-China relations. War in Ukraine has mired Russia in a deadlock of domestic and diplomatic difficulties rendering some political elites in Washington to conceive an imagination-war is the best means to drag down China.
Under the background as aforementioned, Taiwan is gradually and purposely shaped as the “breach” in the U.S.-China showdown, “Taiwan Policy Act” is a critical step. In this process, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) are gridlocked in an involuntary situation.
Second, Mainland China might have adopted a strategic cognitive awareness that “a new cold war is unavoidable.” On the eve of a summit meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, Li Zhanshu, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the number three political figure in China visited Russia and conveyed his “understanding and support” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and said straightforwardly “Russia was cornered by the U.S. and NATO” to resort to military resolution.
If we put the above logic into Beijing’s view of “Taiwan Policy Act”, it is applicable. In that Act, though the phrase “to provide Taiwan with arms beneficial to deter the military invasion of People’s Liberation Army” was modified as “to implement strategy to prevent and deter the threatening and invasion of People’s Liberation Army”, on the surface, the rhetoric became moderate, but the crunch lies in replacing “military financing” with “military aid grant” and topping up the amount to $6.5 billion. This action in the eyes of Beijing is tantamount essentially to NATO’s eastern extension to Russia. Will this render a self-perception of “being cornered”?
The top-level leadership in both the United States and mainland China desire and strive to maintain “fight without breaking.” We believe that the initial reaction of mainland China was relatively self- restraint or just limited to name list those promoters of “Taiwan Policy Act” for sanction without a showdown with Biden administration. After all, the situation is stronger than the people, if Taiwan does not want to become the “break” of U.S.-China confrontation, apart from ceasing to promote de jure Taiwan independence, the only thing Taiwan can do is to do its best to maintain the trade and commerce as well as people to people linkage, to allow people across the Taiwan Strait to treat each other friendly and to extend the hope of cross-strait integration.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20220915004289-262101?chdtv